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ABSTRACT 
Validation of EOPs (Emergency Operating Procedures) and FRGs (Function Restoration 
Guidelines) can be achieved either through plant full scope simulator or on desk top exercises. The 
desk top exercise is conducted when for the given scenario plant full scope simulator is not suitable. 
In either verification cases predefined scenario should be evaluated and possible branching 
foreseen. The scenario presented is LOHS, with bleed and feed procedure initiated. Best estimate 
light water reactor transient analysis code RELAP5/mod3.3 was used in calculation. Standardized 
detailed plant model was used. Operator actions were modelled from beginning of the scenario to its 
termination. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The Emergency Operating Procedures validation objective is to ensure that operators can 
manage emergency conditions using the EOPs. The methods of validation: 
(a) The simulator method is a validation method by which control room operators 
perform control functions on simulator equipment according to a scenario and for 
an observer/reviewer. 
(b) The table top validation is method by which personnel explain and/or discuss 
procedure action steps in response to a scenario and for an observer/reviewer. 
The validation method that will provide the most meaningful and thorough scrutiny for the 
EOP set is the simulator method. However, the table top methods will have to be used when there is 
no simulator or if the simulator modelling is incapable of producing a situation that a specific 
procedure addresses. That alternate validation method must also be performed when actions occur 
outside the control room. Modelling limitations of the full scope simulator could typically be 
experienced in a complex thermalhydraulic accident. The EOP developers could validate the 
accidents that are not covered by the simulator models in table top validation. In all cases the 
validation should be carried out under conditions that, to the greatest extent possible, simulate 
conditions during an emergency and include workload and instrument response. Correct application 
of EOP validation will ensure that the EOPs are usable and correct. Usability encompasses two 
concepts, level of detail and ease of understanding. The level of detail must be sufficient but not 
excessive. There should be a balance between providing all possible information and the minimum 
information needed. The plant specific writer’s guide should address the desired level of detail. 
During validation, the user and observer judge whether the level of detail is sufficient. 
When developing validation scenarios the goal is to exercise as many procedures and 
transitions as possible. It is not expected that every conceivable scenario will be covered. 





2 EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE - CONCEPT [1], [2], [3] 
The Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) provide a network of predefined and prioritized 
symptom based response strategies that guide the operator in management of emergency transients. 
Event related recovery and function related restoration strategies are combined to guide diagnosis 
and plant recovery to the optimal end state while ensuring explicit diagnosis and restoration of the 
plant safety state independent of event sequence. 
The approach to the development of the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) depends on 
the plant design configuration from a standpoint of the plant response to emergency transients. For 
example, the maximum shutoff pressure of the safety injection system strongly influences plant 
response to the postulated accident conditions. Based on this fact, the plant can be considered as 
low pressure (LP) or high pressure (HP) type. The HP type approach is applicable to the plants that 
are designed with a safety injection system shutoff pressure greater than the reactor coolant system 
pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV) pressure setpoint. High pressure plants utilize the 
charging pumps as safety injection pumps. The LP version is applicable to plants that are designed 
with a safety injection system shutoff pressure less than the reactor coolant system pressurizer 
power operated relief valve (PORV) pressure setpoint. Low pressure plants do not utilize the 
charging pumps as safety injection pumps. Transient presented in the paper will show response of 
HP plant. 
In general, two types of EOPs are known: Optimal Recovery (Event Oriented) and Critical 
Safety Function Restoration Concept (Symptom Oriented). 
The concept of Optimal Recovery is based on the premise that radiation release and 
equipment damage can both be minimized through associating the symptoms of an emergency 
transient with a predefined plant condition and implementing an associated predefined event related 
recovery strategy to achieve an optimal plant end state. Recovery implies changing the plant state to 
the optimal end state. 
The concept of Critical Safety Function Restoration (symptom related recovery strategies) is 
based on the premise that radiation release to the environment can be minimized if the barriers to 
radiation release are protected. Restoration implies returning the plant state to a safe state in which 
the Critical Safety Functions are satisfied. Hence, a fundamental goal of nuclear safety is the 
prevention of uncontrolled releases of radioactive materials from nuclear power plants. In order to 
accomplish this goal the concept of "defence in depth" [4], which translates into providing multiple 
barriers to the release of the radioactive material, was adopted at the start of the commercial 
development of nuclear energy as a cornerstone of nuclear safety. As long as the fuel 
matrix/cladding, reactor coolant system pressure boundary and containment barriers are intact in a 
nuclear power plant, that plant poses no threat to the health and safety of the general public. 
The whole EOPs should provide emergency response strategies that utilize both emergency 
operations concepts. The Optimal Recovery concept is utilized as the primary emergency operations 
concept. The associated symptom based recovery strategies are structured to implicitly maintain the 
Critical Safety Functions. In this way the event related recovery strategies provide guidance to 
obtain the optimal plant end state while maintaining the Critical Safety Functions. 
3 LOSS OF HEAT SINK [5] 
A loss of secondary heat sink can occur as a result of several different initiating events. 
Possibilities are a loss of main feedwater during power operation, a loss of offsite power, or any 
other scenario for which main feedwater is isolated or lost when the steam generators provide the 
main heat removal path. For these initiating transients a failure of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) 
system to inject or a loss of AFW early in the cooldown, before RHR (Residual Heat Removal) 
System operation can be established, could lead to a loss of secondary heat sink. 
A loss of all feedwater transient is characterized by a depletion of secondary inventory and 
eventual degradation of secondary heat transfer capability. As secondary heat transfer capability 





degrades, a loss of secondary heat sink results and core decay heat generation will increase RCS 
(Reactor Coolant System) temperature and pressure until the pressurizer PORVs or safety valves 
(SVs) open to relieve the increasing RCS pressure. At this point the opening and closing of the 
PORVs or safety valves will result in a loss of RCS inventory similar in nature to a Small Break 
Loss of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA). If operator action is not taken, the pressurizer PORVs or SVs 
will continue to cycle open and closed at the valve setpoint pressure removing RCS inventory and a 
limited amount of core decay heat until eventually enough inventory will be lost to result in core 
uncovery. 
 
3.1 "Bleed and feed" vs. "feed and bleed" technique [6], [7] 
Bleed and feed is the process of manually initiating high pressure safety injection and 
manually opening the pressurizer PORVs to depressurize the RCS to allow the injection of 
sufficient water which will provide decay heat removal and core cooling. Feed and bleed is the 
process of manually initiating HPSI (High Pressure Safety Injection - SI charging) and permitting 
the automatic cycling of the PORVs at their set pressure to vent RCS inventory and provide decay 
heat removal and core cooling. This process then takes place at RCS pressures at and above the 
PORV setpoint pressure. The Feed and bleed process is only possible in HP type plants. 
Bleed and feed is established by first starting all HPSI and/or HHSI (High Head Safety 
Injection) pumps and verifying their delivery and, then, manually opening and holding open all 
PORVs. Feed and bleed is established by starting all HPSI. The injection from the HPSI pumps and 
the RCS heatup will force an intermittent release of RCS inventory by the pressurizer PORVs. 
Thus, during the feed and bleed process the pressurizer PORVs are forced to open (automatically) 
and close repeatedly, relieving excess RCS inventory as a result of HPSI and RCS heatup. 
The recommended alternate heat removal method is bleed and feed. Adequate PORV 
reliability is required to be demonstrated to support the use of feed and bleed since the PORV will 
open and close continuously over a long period of time. If feed and bleed were initiated when the 
symptoms of loss of heat sink were observed, the option to later revert to bleed and feed would be 
lost, since in feed and bleed the SI flow rate is low enough such that the system would begin to boil 
after a short period of time. Once boiling began, depressurization of the RCS using PORVs without 
having core uncovery would be highly unlikely. Core uncovery would be necessary to reduce the 
steam generation rate to a rate that permitted RCS depressurization using pressurizer PORVs. Thus, 
the use of feed and bleed precludes the use of bleed and feed without core uncovery and possible 
core damage. Therefore, based on the above arguments, feed and bleed is not recommended to 
provide an alternative heat removal method during a loss of secondary heat sink condition. 
4 DESCRIPTION OF MODEL [8] 
Model has been developed to a high level of detail and includes detailed discretization of all 
important components of the plant primary and secondary side (Reactor Pressure Vessel – RPV and 
Stem Generators - SG) and the models of the Emergency Core Cooling System - ECCS, Main 
Feedwater - MFW and Auxiliary Feedwater - AFW and simplified model of charging and letdown 
system. The ECCS consist of HPSI (High Pressure Safety Injection - SI charging), HHSI (High 
Head Safety Injection), ACC (Accumulators) and LPSI (Low Pressure Safety Injection - RHR 
system). Protection and control system has been developed according to the plant available 
documentation. The model has been developed with necessary fidelity of geometrical and operating 
parameters. Verified and recommended RELAP5 modelling techniques are used in preparation of 
RELAP5 input deck.[9] Steady state calculation was verified against real plant data and was found 
satisfactory. [8] Nodalization has been qualified on steady state and transient level. [10], [11] The 
overview of SI system is presented in Table 1. 






Table 1 Overview of the Plant SI injection system 
System Shut off Pressure [MPa] Maximum Delivery Capacity Pressure [MPa] 
HPSI 20.00 8.24 
HHSI 10.50 5.00 
ACC 5.00 - 
LPSI 1.39 1.05 
 
5 TRANSIENT DESCRIPTION 
The plant presented is high pressure (employees charging pumps as safety injection pumps), 
two loop PWR. Power to primary volume ratio is approximately two times smaller than what is 
usual. This results in smaller amount decay heat needed to be transferred to SGs, and longer time 
for SGs to lose their function as a heat sink. Because of that the operator have longer available time 
before initiating bleed and feed process. 
 
5.1 Main Transient Conditions 
From the beginning of transient there is following equipment status: 
 MFW (Main Feed Water) and AFW (Auxiliary Feed Water) 
 Steam Dump is not Available 
 SGs' PORVs and SVs are available 
 MSL (Main Steam Line) isolation occurs on the start of transient 
 1/2 ECCS operational - (one HPSI, two HHSI and one LPSI pump) 
 
5.2 Results 
Transient starts from full power operation (1000 MWt) and loss of MFW. At the same time 
both steam lines (SL) are isolated on spurious signal. Overview of sequence of events is given in 
Table 2. 
Table 2 Time Sequence of Events 
Event Time 
MFW isolation 0.05 s (on start of LOHS) 
SL isolation 0.05 s (on start of LOHS) 
Reactor trip (RX) 17.96s (lo-1 SG2 level (SG2 NR (Narrow Range) 
<setpoint) and steam/FW2 mismatch SG2 setpoint) 
Turbine trip 18.46s (on RX trip) 
Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) trip 900s (manual operator trip at Step 4 of FR-H.1) 
SI signal 3315.40s (manual - FR-H.1 procedure Caution 1 Step 3 
SG2 WR (Wide Range) < setpoint) 
Letdown isolated 3315.40s (automatic on SI actuation) 
Containment isolation 3315.40s (automatic on SI actuation) 
Pressurizer (PRZ) PORVs open 3700s (manual operator opening at Step 16 of FR-H.1) 
AFW started 7300s (restoration - minimal to both SG) 
 





Main events and operator actions are shown at Figure 1. The operators actions are based on 
parameters presented from Figure 2 to Figure 19. The containment response is not modelled. Until 
implementation of bleed and feed technique it is unlikely that there are conditions for adverse 
containment setpoints. Afterwards it is possible that the containment parameters will dictate change 
to adverse containment setpoints. This does not change the overall behaviour of the transient, only 
time window to achieve required setpoints. Because of that, through transient normal containment 
setpoints will be used. 
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Figure 1: RCS and SGs Pressure 
The transient progression is as follows. Procedure E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) is 
entered as response to RX trip (Figure 2). The SGs' NR level is lost at t=80s (Figure 4), but operator 
missed it. Transition from E-0 to ES-0.1 is made as SI was not actuated and according to readings is 
not needed at t=100s (Figure 1 and Figure 3). According to rules of usage, F-0 procedure (Critical 
Safety Function Status Tree - CSFT) is implemented. From F-0 procedure normal containment 
setpoints are used. From Figure 6 to Figure 8 operator verifies steps at ES-0.1 and F-0 CSFT 
priorities. At t=500s RED path in F-0 on Heat Sink status tree is recognised (Figure 4 and Figure 9). 
This tree represents the third highest priority Critical Safety Function, and as such, is always 
entered directly after the Subcriticality and Core Cooling tree. The most serious challenge to the 
Heat Sink Critical Safety Function is an indication of loss of secondary heat sink. A loss of 
secondary heat sink occurs if decay heat removal is needed through the SGs and all feed flow 
capability is lost. Feed flow must be re-established or an alternative heat removal mode (e.g., bleed 
and feed) must be established to prevent core uncovery and eventually an inadequate core cooling 
condition. Since this is an extreme challenge to the fuel clad/matrix barrier to radioactivity release, 
immediate operator action is required and a RED priority is warranted. The loss of secondary heat 
sink condition is the only RED priority included on Heat Sink status tree. 





Transfer from ES-0.1 to FR-H.1 Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink is made at t=500s 
(Figure 4 and Figure 9). The guideline FR-H.1 provides guidance to address an extreme challenge 
(i.e., RED priority) to the Heat Sink Critical Safety Function that results if total feed flow is below a 
minimum value and level is below the narrow range in all SGs at any time. An early indication that 
secondary heat transfer capability may be challenged is that AFW flow is not available to any steam 
generator. Following a RX trip and/or SI, main feedwater isolation is automatically initiated. In this 
transient MFW is not available and is the initiator of the transient. Auxiliary feedwater flow to the 
steam generators must be automatically or manually initiated in order to maintain adequate 
secondary inventory for decay heat removal. Consequently, a failure of the AFW system results in a 
challenge to the Heat Sink Critical Safety Function. The operator is directed to implement guideline 
FR-H.1. The objective is to maintain RCS heat removal capability by establishing feed flow to an 
SG or through establishing RCS bleed and feed heat removal. It is entered at the first indication that 
secondary heat removal capability may be challenged. This permits maximum time for operator 
action to restore feedwater flow to at least one steam generator before secondary inventory is 
depleted and secondary heat removal capability is lost. Once secondary heat removal capability is 
lost, RCS bleed and feed must be established to minimize core uncovery and prevent an inadequate 
core cooling condition. 
After failure to establish AFW flow to SGs from control room, local operator is dispatched to 
restore it. The operator then manually trips RCPs (t=900s, Figure 6). Operation of reactor coolant 
pumps will affect the dryout time of the steam generators due to RCPs heat addition and, therefore, 
will affect the time at which operator action to initiate bleed and feed must occur. By tripping the 
RCPs, the effectiveness of the remaining water inventory in the SGs is extended, which extends the 
time at which the operator action to initiate bleed and feed must occur. This extension of time is 
additional time for the operator to restore feedwater flow to the SGs. 
The next step is for operator to try to start MFW pumps. The MFW is the next source of high 
pressure water readily available to the operator to re-establish the secondary heat sink. Prior to 
restoring MFW flow to the SGs, the operator verifies condensate system operation to ensure a 
source of water to the MFW pumps. Then the MFW isolation valve status is checked. If feedwater 
isolation has occurred, various actions may be required, depending upon the plant specific logic for 
FW isolation, to reset SI and FW isolation signals and reopen the FW isolation valves. If either the 
condensate system cannot be placed in service or no FW isolation valves can be opened, the 
operator is directed to check the status of the secondary heat sink. If the condensate system is 
operational and FW isolation valves are open, then MFW is established by the operator. If MFW 
cannot be established, the operator is directed to attempt to establish condensate flow. In transient 
reinitiation of MFW is partly successful as the MFW delivers some flow to SG1 for two minutes 
(from t=1380-1500s, Figure 9). This has no visible effect as seen on Figure 5. 
As MFW injection was not successful operator is trying to establish feed flow from the 
condensate system. For injection from the condensate system to be successful it is required to 
depressurize SG (low pump head of system). This in turn requires primary depressurization 
(t=1530s using PRZ PORV) to less than P.06 (so that SI signal can be blocked at t=1660s, Figure 1 
and Figure 10). This action is done because of SG depressurization which can lead to fast primary 
depressurization and automatic SI signal could be reached on either primary or secondary low 
pressure. In this way SI actuation is prevented and can not hamper or delay recovery. For secondary 
depressurization SG2 is chosen as some flow from MFW reached SG1. The SG2 is depressurized to 
below setpoint of condensate booster pump head pressure using SG2 PORV (t=1670-2200s, Figure 
1, Figure 10 and Figure 14). Further SG2 depressurization is continued to achieve maximum 
condensate system flow (SG PORV is left in open position). Time of 15 minutes is left for operator 
to try to establish flow from the condensate system. The condensate flow was not established, and 
the operator checks for SGs NR level at t=3100s which is below range. Afterwards operator is 
checking SGs WR for setpoint which determines actuation of bleed and feed (Figure 5). At that 
time the setpoint is not reached in both SGs, and operator is instructed to go to first step of FR-H.1 
(t=3160s). 





At t=3315s setpoint for bleed and feed is reached (Figure 5), and transition to initiating step is 
made. This step initiates manual SI actuation (Figure 11 and Figure 12). After SI delivery 
verification of both PRZ PORVs opening is made at t=3700s (Figure 10 and Figure 13). 
Verification of bleed path is performed (Figure 11 and Figure 12). While proceeding with FR-H.1 
the operator is instructed to perform steps in E-0. These steps are performed because it is possible to 
make a transition to FR-H.1 without having performed the verification of automatic SI actions in E-
0. This step specifically instructs the operator to perform that verification. Performing steps in E-0 
does not initiate any additional operator action in this transient except verifying plant status. 
Through bleed and feed implementation RWST level is monitored for need to switch to 
containment sump (Figure 18). 
The operator reach step loop in FR-H.1 where he is trying to establish secondary heat sink and 
checking for SG WR indication. This loop is maintained, and at t=7300s the minimum AFW for 
heat removal becomes available (Figure 9). Five minutes after, SG2 PORV is closed (Figure 1, 
Figure 10 and Figure 14). The operator remains in the step loop monitoring secondary heat sink. 
The SG1 NR criteria for end of LOHS is reached at t=10 480s (Figure 4). 
Following restoration of secondary heat sink in SG1 (later SG2), the operator is instructed to 
verify core cooling and reduce SI flow. After SI reduction (only HPSI remains - SI charging, Figure 
15, Figure 16, Figure 17, Figure 1, Figure 11 and Figure 19) operator is instructed to close PRZ 
PORVs one by one and to place them in auto position (Figure 1 and Figure 10). During this process 
primary pressure is closely monitored as PRZ is water solid (Figure 13) and any sharp change in 
primary pressure could have devastating effects on RCS. In this transient it is assumed that PRZ 
PORVs will close even after long water discharge. If this would not be the case, the transient would 
propagate in SBLOCA. The verification of bleed and feed termination is done (Figure 12). Operator 
establishes normal letdown and charging (Figure 11). The charging and letdown flow is tuned to 
drain PRZ in normal operating range. The transient ends at t~12000s. 
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Figure 2: Reactor Power 
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Figure 3: Temperatures Cold Leg, Hot Leg, Tavg 
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Figure 4: SGs Level - Narrow Range 
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Figure 5: SGs Level - Wide Range 
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Figure 6: RCPs Velocity 
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Figure 7: Core Exit Thermocouples (CET) Temperature 
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Figure 8: Subcooling 
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Figure 10: PRZ and SGs Valves Integral 
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Figure 11: PRZ PORVs, Charging, Letdown and HPSI Mass Flow 
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Figure 12: PRZ PORVs and ECCS Flow 
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Figure 13: Pressurizer Level 
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Figure 14: SGs PORVs Mass Flow 
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Figure 15: RVLIS Level 
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Figure 16: Upper Head Liquid Fraction 
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Figure 17: Core Level 
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Figure 18: RWST Level 
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Figure 19: HHSI Pumps Mass Flow 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
The paper presents alternative possibility of EOPs and FRGs validation through desk top 
exercise. The desk top evaluation is conducted when plant full scope simulator is not suitable for 
given transient or does not have sufficient capabilities to realistically model plant response. 
Validation scenario presented was LOHS, with bleed and feed technique initiated. Transient 
was computed using RELAP5 model which was suitable for the purpose. As presented, modelling 
of operator actions were done from the start of transient to its termination.  
Procedures that were mostly covered are E-0, F-0 and FR-H.1, while ES-0.1 was just barely 
verified. While performing validation it cannot be expected to pass through every possible scenario 
and step of procedures. The aim is to focus on procedures intention, its background and the 
reasoning for operator actions as well as to cover as many steps as possible. 
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